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Disputed Elections
Machinery of disputed elections in the ‘secure vote’
and ‘secret vote’ systems
and its efficiency in reducing fraud. The UK
parliament approved machinery
of the secure vote to trace voting fraud in 1872.
The Conservative Leader in the House
of Commons, the Duke of Richmond, insisted on an
amendment in the bill, for ‘vote-tracing’. He
argued: “That impersonation was deemed by the
promoter of this Bill to be so serious an offence
that it was declared in the Commons Bill of 1872,
that it was a felony punishable with two years’
imprisonment with hard labour. That being so, it
seemed to be absolutely necessary to provide some
machinery by which the vote could be traced, because
without this the offence could hardly be proved.”
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Today, there is now no such
‘machinery’ by which any vote can be traced.
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Defeated candidates must find
their own evidence of possible fraud within 40
days.
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This is impossible because
neither candidates nor parties have the time or
money to track evidence in proof.
A climate of denial, that significant
fraud occurs, exists in recent reports to, and by,
the Commonwealth parliament. This is no longer the
case in the UK where the conduct of the May 6, 2010
election is currently under investigation by police
in 50 constituencies..
 1. Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet
The Department of PM and Cabinet
published a massive 260 pages long ‘issues and
options’ document entitled ‘Key elements of the
Electoral Reform Green Paper – Strengthening
Australia’s Democracy on September 2009. This
document, which was produced by unidentified people,
makes the following extraordinary statement:
“One point to note is that there has been no
evidence of widespread subversion of electoral laws
in Australia. The most common breaches of the
Electoral Act have tended to be inadvertent or
unintentional
(such as the instances of multiple
voting discussed in chapter 11)
or transgressions by individuals that were not
intended to have a broader impact on the outcome of
an election or the actions of others in the
political process
(such as failure to vote).
More serious offences have tended to be isolated
events
(Chapter 14 14.10.”)
2. The Joint Standing Committee
Report on the 2007 election.
“The years leading up to the 2007 election saw the
creation and perpetuation of the mythical ‘straw
man’ of electoral fraud. The 'straw man' has been used
to create and perpetuate an erroneous view that
electoral fraud is commonplace and to overstate its
potential effects. It is worth quoting from the AEC’s first submission to the Swagman inquiry
in which the AEC states categorically: ‘turning first
to entitlement, it can be clearly stated, in
relation to false identities, that there has never
been any evidence of widespread or organized
enrolment fraud in Australia p.”
The H.S. Chapman Society has exposed
such false denials of fraud for 14
years viz:
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"That the electoral system is open to
manipulation is beyond question
... Fraudulent enrolment is almost impossible to prevent."
(NSW Electoral Commissioners, Messrs R.
Cundy and Ian Dickson, NSW Government
Inquiry 1989) |
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